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ADVENTURES IN CYBER-SPACE: COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY AND THE ARKANSAS FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT
Brian G. Brooks*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The information age is upon us. Current computer technology
is making more information available to more people more quickly
than ever before. This information bonanza presents both extraordinary opportunities and difficult challenges in the area of open
records and meetings. Arkansas, like the federal government, guarantees access to government records' and meetings 2 by statute. More
and more frequently, both state and federal government agencies
are relying on computer technologies to compile and store records3
4
and, arguably, conduct meetings.
The opportunities provided by technological advances are obvious. Information is more easily accessed, analyzed and disseminated
through the use of computer technology. For example, sorting and
classifying information held in large government databases can be

*
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1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105 (Michie 1992).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1988); ARK CODE ANN. § 25-19-106 (Michie 1992).
3. For example, in 1966 when the federal Freedom Of Information Act was
adopted, federal agencies were using some 3,000 mainframe computers and no
micro-computers. Jamie A. Grodsky, The Freedom of Information Act in the
Electronic Age: The Statute is Not User Friendly, 31 JURIMETRICS J. 17, 18 (1990).
Twenty short years later nearly 25,000 mainframes and more than 125,000 microcomputers were in use and 97 of the 134 agencies or components that responded
to an Office of Technology Assessment study were using e-mail services. Id.
Likewise, one may infer a dramatic increase in computer use by government
agencies in Arkansas by surveying requests made of the Attorney General's office.
For example, in June 1993, Twelfth Judicial District Prosecuting Attorney Ron
Fields requested an opinion regarding licensed abstractor's access to computerized
assessor's records, Op. Att'y Gen. 120 (1993), and State Auditor Julia Hughes
Jones requested an opinion concerning access to computerized voter registration
lists, Op. Att'y Gen. 405 (1994). The magnitude of such lists is enormous and
representative of the sort of computerized data created by the State of Arkansas
and various local governments.
4. In part II F., infra, a hypothetical meeting will be considered. At present,
it appears that no case has specifically addressed this issue. However, if the equivalent
of a "meeting" may be conducted over the internet, the cases will soon follow.
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accomplished with a few keystrokes rather than by the hours of
painstaking reading, listing and charting performed manually. Likewise, meetings once "open" only to those with the resources and
time to physically attend, may be accessible to anyone with a personal

computer and an online service.
On the other hand, the challenges facing both accessors and
government officials charged with providing access are considerable.
To begin with, the various pieces of legislation that provide access
were written in the 1960s and 1970s. 5 As a result, technology has
passed them by. Courts are left with the difficult task of determining
which records and meetings fall under the ambit of the legislation.
Moreover, many groups and individuals who wish to gain access to
government records and meetings contend that government agencies
and officials are using computer technology, coupled with the out6
dated legislation to frustrate the purposes of the legislation.
The purpose of this article is to focus attention on the impact
computer technology has on the Arkansas Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). 7 This purpose will be accomplished, where possible, by

5. The federal legislation was enacted in 1966 and last amended in 1986. 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1988). The Arkansas legislation was enacted in 1967 and has received
numerous patchwork-type amendments through the years. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 2519-101 to -107 (Michie 1992). No amendment to either act has squarely addressed
computer technology.
6. Matthew D. Bunker et. al, Access to Government-Held Information in the
Computer Age: Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 543 (1993); Leo T. Sorokin, The Computerization of Government Information: Does it Circumvent Public Access Under the Freedom of Information Act
and the Depository Library Program?, 24 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 267 (1991);
Grodsky, supra note 3; Sol Villasana, The People's Right to Know in the Age of
Electronic Information, BARRISTER, Fall 1990, at 61.
7. Throughout this article "FOIA" is referred to rather than "an F.O.I.A."
This approach is grammatically correct. In access to information circles, the term
IA ISpronounced "- ..
. Moreover, a set of terms isevolving in conjunction with FOIA practice. You will notice many of them in this article such
as "redact," "compact," and "disclosure avoidance technique." Finally, "FOIA"
is generally a noun which refers to the piece of legislation that mandates access
to government records (native Southerners would call it a "nickname"). However,
"FOIA" can also be a verb referring to the act of requesting access. Thus, one
may "FOIA" the County Clerk, who will then state that he has been "FOIA'd."
This new "language" surrounding the FOIA might be called "FOIA-speak."
The issues discussed in the following pages have been addressed in the context
of the federal FOIA. Four previous works are heavily relied upon. Grodsky, supra
note 3; Bunker et al., supra note 6; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Acquisition
and Release of FederalAgency Information: Analysis of Recommendations Adopted
by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 41 ADMIN. L. REv. 253
(1989) (hereinafter Electronic Acquisition and Release); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Federal
Electronic Information Policy, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 201 (1990) (hereinafter Federal
Electronic Information Policy). The interested reader will want to review these
articles as well as the others cited.
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applying either the FOIA or the cases interpreting the FOIA to the
issues which are generally considered to be the most important in
this area. However, cases from other jurisdictions, principally those
construing the federal FOIA, will also be used because the Arkansas
cases provide only limited assistance.
This* analysis leads to the conclusion that legislative action is
appropriate. Therefore, three separate proposals will be examined
and analyzed. None of these proposals is perfect; however, if the
General Assembly is finally prepared to accept Professor John J.
Watkins' invitation and begin fixing the flaws in the FOIA,8 these
proposals provide an excellent starting point for the issues posed
by computer technology.

II.
A.

DEFINING THE ISSUES

Is Computerized Information a Record?

The great weight of authority indicates that computerized
information is a record for FOIA purposes. In Arkansas, the plain
language of the FOIA combined with Blaylock v. Staley9 should
leave no question about this issue.
The Arkansas FOIA defines records as, among other things,
* data compilations in any form, . . . which constitute a record
of the performance or lack of performance of official functions
....,,"0 This definition is clearly broad enough to include computer
records. Such records are a "compilation" of "data" in a particular,
i.e., electronic, "form." Thus, so long as the content of a record
addresses the performance or lack of performance of official functions,
computer records meet this definition.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas appears to accept this reasoning.
In Blaylock v. Staley, Len Blaylock, the Chairman of the Republican
Party of Arkansas, requested access to the Pulaski County voter
registration list on computer tape. The county clerk gave Blaylock
a printed list of approximately 180,000 names" but denied access

8. John J. Watkins, The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act: Time For a
Change, 44 ARK. L. REV. 535 (1991).
9. 293 Ark. 26, 732 S.W.2d 152 (1987).
10. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(1) (Michie 1992).
11. JOHN J. WATKINS, ARKANSAS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 69 (2d ed.
1994).
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to the computer tape. Blaylock then brought suit under the Arkansas
FOIA in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County asking that the clerk
be compelled to release the computer tape.' 2 The clerk and Datafacts,
Inc., the private computer firm that maintained the list for the
county, contended that they did not have the equipment necessary
to copy the list onto another disk or tape. 3 As a result, the tape,
or data module, would have to be taken elsewhere for copying. The
circuit court found that such a request amounted to a request for
"equipment" rather than for a "record" and denied Blaylock access. ' 4
Blaylock appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, once
again contending that the data module was a record that could be
copied at Datafacts, Inc.'s office.' 5 The court agreed with Blaylock
that the computerized form of the list was a record for FOIA
purposes.1 6 However, working under the assumption that the data
module would have to be removed from the Datafacts, Inc.'s offices
in order to be copied, the court denied access.' 7 According to the
court, it was impossible to determine from the trial record whether
the request was for "information" or for "equipment. '"' 8
To say that Blaylock is confusing is an understatement. On the
one hand, the court stated that it "need not look beyond the language
of our own Freedom of Information Act" in order to determine
that a computer tape is a record under the FOIA.' 9 The definition
of records, which includes "recorded sounds, films, tapes, or data
compilations in any form," ' 20 along with the historically liberal
interpretation given the FOIA,2' brings within its ambit computerized
records. These factors "provide[] all the guidance necessary. "22
On the other hand, the court ruled that a request for a computer
"record" can become a request for computer "equipment" if the
tape has to be removed before it can be copied. According to the
court, "the FOIA requires no such measures.1 2 Professor Watkins
interprets this reasoning to mean that if the ability to copy the tape

12. Blaylock, 293 Ark. at 27, 732 S.W.2d at 153.

13.

WATKINS,

supra note 11, at 69.

14. Blaylock, 293 Ark. at 27, 732 S.W.2d at 153.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 28-29, 732 S.W.2d at 154.
18. Id. at 29, 732 S.W.2d at 154.
19. Id. at 27, 732 S.W.2d at 153.
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(1) (Michie 1992).
21. Blaylock, 293 Ark. at 27, 732 S.W.2d at 153 (citing Laman v. McCord,
245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 29, 732 S.W.2d at 154.
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exists with the agency, then the copy must be made.2 4 It should be
noted, however, that the confused language in Blaylock leaves at
least a shadow of a doubt on this conclusion. Certainly there is
room within the Blaylock opinion for the court to reverse ground
and rule that all computerized records are mere equipment and thus
outside the FOIA.
The most recent federal case to address this area relied heavily
on a similar statutory definition of "records." Armstrong v. Executive
Office of the President (the PROFS Case) 25 discussed whether
preserving hardcopy versions of e-mail messages discharged an agency's
obligations under the Federal Records Act (FRA). 26 The District of
27
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that it did not.
The PROFS Case began on the final day of the Reagan
Presidency. 28 On January 19, 1989, the National Security Archive
filed several FOIA requests "for all the material stored on the
[Executive Office of the President] and [National Security Council]
electronic communications systems from their installation in the mid1980s up to that time." ' 29 At the same time, the PROFS plaintiffs

sought a declaration that the "electronic documents" contained on
those systems, as well as their back-up tapes were "federal and
presidential records" under the FRA and the Presidential Records
Act (PRA), respectively, thus precluding their destruction.3 0
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
agreed with the federal district court's ruling that the electronic
communications, or e-mail messages, as well as the backup tapes,
were records under the FRA. Central to the court's reasoning was
the fact that the hardcopy printouts did not include vital information
such as who sent the message and when. Only the e-mail messages
themselves contained that information. 3 ' Thus, in order to meet the
requirements of the FRA, the e-mail messages must be preserved.
Merely printing the message will not suffice because the additional
3
information would be lost.

2

24. WATKINS, supra note 11, at 70. The Arkansas Attorney General shares this
view. Op. Att'y Gen. 405 (1994).

25. 1 F.3d 1274 (1993). PROFS is the name of the computer system which was
in use at the beginning of this litigation. Id. at 1279 n.2.
26. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2118, 3101-3107, 3301-3324 (1988).
27. Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1284.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1280.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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which is similar

to the Arkansas FOIA definition. It includes ". . . all machine
readable materials, ...
regardless of physical form or characteristics
...., The court interpreted this portion of the definition to include
computerized records. 34 This language is very similar to the "data
compilation in any form" language of the Arkansas FOIA. It should
come as no surprise, then, that both the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Arkansas Supreme
Court came to the conclusion that computer records were "records"
under the respective pieces of legislation."
Thus, it is probably safe to conclude that computer records
survive this threshold inquiry.36 The clear language of the Arkansas

33. 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988).
34. Armstrong, I F.3d at 1278. Specifically, the court wrote as follows: "machine
readable, [i.e., electronic], materials .... ." Id.
35. Interestingly, the argument was made that e-mail is not a record at all.
Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335 (D.D.C. 1993),
aff'd 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993). That argument is clearly at odds with the
FRA, the federal FOIA, and the clear language of the Arkansas FOIA. Moreover,
the argument defies the policy of the FOIA. First, even if e-mail is more analogous
to a telephone conversation than a record, that fact is somewhat irrelevant. In
either case, the "occurrence" should be open under the FOIA as either a meeting
or a record. Any rule of law to the contrary is merely an effort to circumvent
the intentions of the FOIA.
Second, even if the actual e-mail transmission is a "conversation," its subsequent
memorialization makes it a record. An analogy to a tape-recorded telephone call
is useful. If a telephone conversation occurs and one of the parties to the conversation
tape-records it, that recording becomes a record for FOIA purposes. Likewise, if
an e-mail conversation occurs and is memorialized in the form of a recorded
message, that too should be a record under the FOIA. Any attempt to avoid
disclosure should depend on the FOIA exemptions, not on the format of the
conversation.
Finally,- --the
notion
that e-mail, by its very character,
-- :-1.-:un
"
. .L.n r,-lT*is , exempt from disclosure
e- acte
offendsa tire
spirit of open government underlying the F%_11"I fierrfl,*
17011 A wasencd
to guarantee an informed electorate. If the contents of an e-mail message meet
that goal, then the contents should be disclosed, unless disclosure would violate
some overriding interest, such as personal privacy. In any event, the exemption
should be decided on a narrow, case-by-case basis, not broadly as advocated here.
36. Federal FOIA cases are in accord with the above discussion and the PROFS
Case in holding that information stored in government computers is a record for
FOIA purposes. Dismukes v. Dep't of Interior, 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984);
Long v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). In Long, the requesters sought access to "all the
information the IRS has compiled in the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP)[,]" which is a continuing series of statistical studies by the IRS "to
measure the level of compliance with federal tax laws." Id. at 364. In particular,
the Longs sought access to the data tapes which were the "underlying documents
from which TCMP statistics and conclusions are derived." Id. In addition, the
Longs requested that all "identifying information" be deleted from the tapes. Id.
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FOIA, combined with Blaylock and analogous language from the
PROFS Case, leaves no other logical conclusion. Therefore, other,
more complex issues must be addressed. These, as should become
apparent, are somewhat more difficult and unsettled.
B.

Must the Agency Release the Computer Record if Requested?

One such issue is whether a request for computer records must
be met when the records also exist in another form. Blaylock arguably
decides this point by inference in Arkansas. As previously stated,
the requester in that case sought access to computer tapes as opposed
to printed voter registration lists. The Arkansas Supreme Court
indicated that the record was available in computer form. The court,
however, never analyzed whether a requester has the right to request
a particular format. The logical inference, though certainly not the
only inference,3 7 is that when records exist in more than one format
in Arkansas, the requester may demand a particular format.
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court should do more than
just allow access to particular records if that is indeed what it
intended to do. It should clearly articulate the policies behind its
ruling. The federal courts have done just that. The Arkansas Supreme
Court, however, reached the opposite conclusion.
Dismukes v. Department of the Interior 8 dealt primarily with
this issue. In Dismukes, the requester, Philip Dismukes, sought a
copy of a Department of Interior computer tape which listed the
participants in all six Bureau of Land Management Simultaneous
Oil and Gas Leasing bimonthly lotteries for 1982 by name and
address.3 9 The Department of Interior made the list available to

The district court had concluded that "the term 'records,' as used in the [FOIA],
does not include computer tapes." Id. at 365.
Then-Circuit Judge Anthony M. Kennedy rejected this conclusion. Important
to his reasoning was that "[iln view of the common, widespread use of computers
by government agencies for information storage and processing, any interpretation
of the FOIA which limits its application to conventional written documents contradicts the 'general philosophy of full agency disclosure' which Congress intended
to establish." Id. (quoting and citing S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1965)). Thus, "the FOIA applies to computer tapes to the same extent it applies
to any other documents." Id.
37. Another reading of the case is that even if the requester can demand a
particular format, Blaylock still loses because his request is for equipment as opposed
to records. This reading is somewhat more narrow and would be a major setback
for access advocates. However, it would be more consistent with the federal cases,
as the following textual discussion indicates.
38. 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984).
39. Id. at 760-61.

424
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Dismukes in microfiche form, but refused his request for the computer
40
file .
As the court noted in its opinion, Dismukes is a somewhat
atypical case.4 1 As a general rule, an agency usually resists disclosure
on two grounds. First, it will challenge the "'agency record' status
of the document. '42 In addition, the agency will contend that one
of the enumerated exemptions to the FOIA applies.4 3 In this case,
the agency did neither. It merely contended that it had complied
with the request when it released the microfiche records."
In denying Dismukes' request and upholding the Department's
action, the District of Columbia District Court held that an agency
could meet its FOIA requirements by providing access to records
equivalent to those actually requested. In order to prevail in his
request for a particular type of record, Dismukes would have to
demonstrate that the variation in format would affect the "quantum
45
of information" made available.
This holding was dictated by the court's view of the "fundamental
purpose" of the FOIA. According to the court, that purpose is "to
open the doors of government" so that the electorate will be
informed.4 Thus, courts have focused on the "informational content"
of records when interpreting their status under the FOIA. 47 The
format of the record is only relevant when the format affects the
content of the information. Because the information contained on
the microfiche did not vary "in any way" from that in the computer
49
tape, 48 Dismukes had no right to specify one format over another.
The court did, however, provide an example of a variation in
content arising from the format of the record. An audio tape could
be required, as opposed to a transcript of the recording, because
the "transcription removes nuances of inflection which give words
added meaning beyond that reproducible on paper." 50 Conversely,
40. Id. at 761.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 762.
46. Id. at 761.
47. Id. (citing Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595
(1982); Breuhaus v. IRS, 609 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1979); Zale Corp. v. IRS, 481 F.
Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1979)).
48. Id. at 762.
49. Id. at 763.
50. Id. at 762; cf., New York Times Co. v. NASA, 782 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C.
1991) (holding that the privacy interest in a tape recording of the final moments
of the Challenger astronauts' lives was greater than the privacy interest in a transcript
of that tape).
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the computer records requested by Dismukes did not vary "in any
way" from the microfiche."
This argument is potentially very useful. The Arkansas Supreme
Court has held, for example, that the privacy interest in a tape
recording is greater than the privacy interest in a transcript of that
recording.5 2 This holding is tantamount to stating that the quantum
of information contained in a tape recording is different from the
quantum of information contained in a transcript. Thus, it is logical
to assume that the Arkansas courts will accept the quantum of
information argument even if a requester does not have the absolute
right to one format over another.
The district court also rejected Dismukes' contention that the
failure to release the computer record would "unreasonably hamper"
his access to information." In effect, the court ruled that the fact
that the requester would find a microfiche copy less convenient was
irrelevant. Whether the "quantum of information" contained by the
4
two formats was equivalent was the only relevant question.1
The Supreme Court of Ohio, conversely, has held that one such
policy underlying the decision to release the information in its computer
form is the added value of that form. In Ohio ex rel. Margolius
v. City of Cleveland," that court required the government agency
to release information in the requested computer format. The "greater
ease of public access," said the court, created "added value" which
was "inherently" part of the record. 6 Moreover, this added value
demonstrated that release of the information in the paper form
would be "insufficient or impracticable. ' 57 As a result, the records
must be disclosed in their computer form.
The PROFS Case, likewise, could be read to say that a computer
record, by its very nature, is a type of record which may be
specifically requested.58 This reading is possible because the PROFS
court ruled that the printed versions of the e-mail messages would
be insufficient to preserve the records.5 9 In other words, the computer

51. Dismukes, 603 F. Supp. at 762.
52. Young v. Rice, 308 Ark. 593, 598, 826 S.W.2d 252, 255 (1992).
53. Dismukes, 603 F. Supp. at 762. The Department countered this argument
by stating the information was more readily accessible to more people in microfiche
form because no sophisticated computer equipment was needed. Id. at 762-63.
54. See also SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding

an agency's database computer tapes were not within the scope of FOIA).
55. 584 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1992).
56. Id.at 669.
57. Id.
58. See discussion supra Part II.A.
59. Armstrong, 1 F.3d. at 1281, 1296.
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record may be requested because it has separate and distinct
information. Two problems exist with this reading: First, the case
is not a FOIA case but an FRA case. The FOIA issue is still
unresolved.
Second, and more importantly, that reading is far too broad.
The case is more realistically read as stating that the computer record
is distinct only when a computer record contains separate information
which is essential to its defining or informing on a government
function or activity. The- PROFS court specifically stated that the
paper documents alone would be of "quite limited utility to researchers
and investigators studying the formulation and dissemination of
significant policy initiatives at the highest reaches of our
government." ' 60 Thus, the electronic record must also be preserved.
This reading is more consistent with the purposes of the FOIA
to disclose "what [the] government is up to."' 6' It is also more
consistent with the language used in Dismukes indicating that when
the computer record contains a different quantum of information,
it must be disclosed. 62 In other words, the computer records in the
form of e-mail messages had a different quantum of information
because they contained information relevant to government activity
which was absent from the hardcopy versions.
A simple analogy helps to make this point. If a government
employee is creating a government document, for instance a
memorandum, on WordPerfect and wishes to underline a word, he
will press the "F8" key. When that key is pressed, it puts information
into the computer form of the memorandum which does not exist
in the paper version: the codes which create the underlining. In a
literal sense, the computer document contains a different "quantum
of information" than its paper version. This information, however,
has nothing whatsoever to do with the functioning of government.
Thus, it should not be the basis for a rule requiring release of the
computer document.
We are left, then, with something of a dilemma. Nothing in
the Arkansas FOIA gives a requester the right to demand a record
in a particular format. Blaylock could be seen as authority for the
proposition that a requester may demand the computer record. 6

60. Id. at 1285.
61. United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
62. See discussion supra Part II.A.
63. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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However, the case does not explicitly so hold. Moreover, that
interpretation is at odds with the cases interpreting the federal FOIA.
A definitive legislative answer to this problem is needed.
C.

When is a New Record Created?
A central issue in this debate is: when does a request amount
to a request for a new record? 64 This problem arises principally from
the fact that both the federal and the Arkansas acts were written
for a paper era rather than a computer era. The heart of this
question is whether a new record is "created" by merely imputing
data which may be reproduced in many forms by a series of keystrokes
65
or by actually sorting and using that data in a particular format.
Generally, an agency has no obligation to "create" a new record
from existing records in order to fulfill a particular request. For
example,° if a record lists all voters, an agency is not required to
extract from that master list a list of all female voters in order to
fulfill a FOIA request. This policy was formulated when records
existed primarily in a paper form. The question today is whether
it has continuing viability when applied to computer records.
Notably, no Arkansas case has yet addressed this particular
issue. 66. Thus, one must look to the federal cases for guidance. In
Yeager v. DEA ,67 Matthew Yeager was denied access to the Drug
Enforcement Agency's Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information
System (NADDIS) because it contained exempt and nonexempt
information. 68 Subsequently, Yeager contended that the DEA had a

64. The issue may also be stated in terms of whether searching or programming
is required by the FOIA. See, e.g., Bunker et al., supra note 6, at 574-79; Sean
E. Andrussier, The Freedom of Information Act in 1990: More Freedom for the
Government; Less Information for the Public, 1991 DUKE L. J. 753, 790-93 (1991);
Grodsky, supra note 3, at 25-31. See generally Perritt, FederalElectronicInformation
Policy, supra note 7, at 230-32; Perritt, Electronic Acquistion and Release, supra
note 7. Computer records exist in the form of electronic impulses rather than what
we normally think of as "records in being." Grodsky, supra note 3, at 24; Perritt,
Electronic Acquistion and Release, supra note 7, at 230. Thus, some sort of coding
or programming is necessary in order to view the "record" in a form that is
understandable. This fact fostered concern over whether computerized records were
"records" under the federal FOIA. Grodsky, supra note 3, at 24-25. This concern
is probably avoided in Arkansas given the statutory definition of records and
Blaylock. See discussion supra Part II.A. Moreover, even in the federal context,
computerized records are generally thought to be subject to the FOTA. Perritt,
Federal Electronic Information Policy, supra note 7, at 224-26. Each of the articles
cited above includes a discussion, in varying degrees of depth, of the new records
issue.
65. Cf. Bunker et al., supra note 6, at 574-76; Grodsky, supra note 3, at 26.

66.

WATKINS,

supra note 11, at 71-72.

67. 678 F.2d 315 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
68. Id. at 317-18.
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duty to use its "computer capabilities" to segregate the nonexempt
portions .69
The process Yeager requested is described as a "disclosureavoidance technique," or "compacting," because it releases only the
nonexempt information when a record contains both exempt and
nonexempt information. 70 This process is, arguably, consistent with
the general duty to redact exempt information which is "reasonably
segregable ' 7' in order to make a record disclosable. 72 On the other
hand, an agency is not required to create a new record from previously
existing records in order to meet a request.73 Yeager's particular
'74
request, the court held, was a "hybrid of both concepts."
Analogizing an agency's responsibility with respect to "manual
retrieval systems," the court denied Yeager's request. According to
the court, "[t]he FOIA does not contemplate imposing a greater
segregation duty upon agencies that choose to store records in
computers . . . . 7 Indeed, the court noted that the Senate Report
on the 1974 amendments, in its "sole reference" to computerized
records, stated that "the term 'search' 76 would include services
functionally analogous to searches of records maintained in

conventional form.
In other
more similar
In so doing,
equation. In
the focus is

77

words, the court ruled that Yeager's request would be
to the written report about a record than to redacting.
it focused on the "reasonableness" of the segregation
deciding whether information is reasonably segregable,
on whether an intelligible record is produced as well

69. Id. at 319.

70. Id. at 319 n.9.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1988). "Any reasonably segregable portion of a record
shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions
which are exempt under this subsection." Id. This process is commonly known as
redaction.
The Arkansas FOIA does not specifically require redaction and the Arkansas
Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue. However, the court has shown
support for the idea of redaction. See, e.g., Young v. Rice, 308 Ark. 593, 826
S.W.2d 252 (1992); accord Op. Att'y Gen. 002, 106 (1993), 132 (1992).
72. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 373-76 (1976);
see also Bunker et al., supra note 6, at 576-79 (discussing the similarity between
redacting and compacting).
73. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1975).
74. Yeager, 678 F.2d at 322.
75. Id.

76. The term "search" is used by the court to connote the process of locating
information. It could just as easily have referred to sorting, programming, or record
creation.
77. Id. at 321 (quoting S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974)).
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as the "burden" placed on the agency.7 8 This analysis, combined
with the fact that Congress placed no greater burden on agencies
using electronic storage systems, led to the rejection of Yeager's
request. The request, according to the court, was the "functional
equivalent" of creating a new record and, thus, not required by the
FOIA.79
The court did, however, show some sympathy for requesters in
Yeager's position. First, in an interesting footnote, the court stated
that "computerized recordkeeping" could have an impact on FOIA
analysis in some circumstances. 0 By way of example, the court noted
that an agency's "'burden in segregating' nonexempt information"
may be lessened." As a result, the analysis of the "extent of the
effort expended or the costs involved" could be affected.8 2 Under
the intelligibility plus burden analysis, this decreased burden could
have a major effect.
Additionally, the court noted that Yeager's interpretation of the
FOIA burden to compact data "may be desirable in terms of full
disclosure policy." 3 However, purely as a matter of Congressional
intent, it had to be denied. For that reason,. "[a] requester must
take the agency records as he finds them."' '
This reasoning is unfortunate. Given the historically liberal
construction of the FOIA,85 the court could easily have applied the
6
same analytical framework and arrived at the opposite conclusion.
Clearly an intelligible document would be produced by meeting the
request. Only identifying characteristics would be deleted. Therefore,
the gravamen of the case in Yeager is the burden on the government.
That burden is dramatically reduced with computer databases. Onae
again, the FOIA was drafted for a paper era. If Yeager had made
an analogous request prior to the advent of computer databases, it
would clearly have been unreasonable. Such a request amounts to
asking an agency to search all of its files and compile a new report
consisting only of the requested information, a requirement that

78. Id. at 322 n.16.
79. Id.at 320-23.
80. Id.at 322 n.17.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.at 323.
84. Id.
85. Cf. Reporter's Committee, 489 U.S. at 754-55; Mead Data Cent., Inc. v.
Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d
820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
86. Cf. Perritt, Federal Electronic Information Policy, supra note 7, at 232;

Grodsky, supra note 3, at 29-31.
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would be an extreme burden for the agency charged with meeting
the request.87
On the other hand, computer technology relieves a major portion
of the burden on the agency. If the software is correctly programmed,88
an agency can "create" this new record with a few keystrokes.
The computer, rather than the agency personnel, performs the majority
of the task. This fact undercuts much of the reasoning behind the
''no new record" rule.
Moreover, the court appears to presume the existence of the
burden based on cases interpreting the duty of an agency where
paper records were at issue. That presumption is inappropriate where
computer records are concerned. Therefore, the government should
bear the burden of establishing the existence of a burden that is
onerous enough to overwhelm the policy of full agency disclosure.8 9
A lingering question after Yeager is how to draw the line between
redacting and compacting." Apparently, the fact that compacting
was necessary was undisputed. Surely the fact that the process would
be accomplished by computer rather than by hand is not the key.
The best answer one can infer is that compacting calls for a total

87. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975). In that
case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that an agency had no duty to write
an opinion based on a record or add explanatory material to a document in order
to meet a request. Id. at 161-62.
88. Perritt, Federal Electronic Information Policy, supra note 7, at 230-32;

Grodsky, supra note 3, at 29-31.
89. See AccEss REPORTS (Access Reports, Inc., Lynchburg, VA), March 30,
1994. Quoted in this report is language by Judge Louis Oberdorfer which appears
to accept this analysis in Thompson Publishing Group, Inc. v. Health Care Fin.
Admin., No. 92-2431-LFO (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 1994). Judge Oberdorfer states:
[Tihe law governing an agency's search obligations has not kept up.with
advancing computer technology. Even the 1982 decision in Yeager .

..

is

outdated. A traditional FOIA search could include physically retrieving
1,000 different paper forms or "records," each of which has been placed
in a separate file, and each of which contains only one relevant paragraph.
This would be analogous to (and much more difficult than) a computer
"query search" for those paragraphs. If defendant has categorized its data
by size of employer, for example, and the plaintiff's request can be retrieved
by a single search or a simple series of searches, then the information
exists in the form of parts of multiple "records." And those records are,
in part, being improperly withheld unless the defendant can show the
information is exempt or that the search is too onerous. This acknowledgement that an agency is required to conduct relatively simple computer
searches is limited to retrieval of parts of existing records and does not
require an agency to conduct analyses of existing records.
Id. at 2.

90. Bunker et al., supra note 6, at 576-78.
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re-ordering of data whereas redacting merely deletes certain facts. 9'
The Yeager court, although reluctantly, held that agencies do
not have to manipulate data in order to comply with a request.
This holding is unfortunate, but probably necessary. It is unfortunate
in that the public is deprived of information which could be made
available relatively easily through computer technology. It is necessary
because the federal FOIA, like the Arkansas FOIA, does not
differentiate between the types of records which are compiled. Clearly,
it would be too burdensome to undertake the type of task at issue
in Yeager with paper records. 92 As a result, the task is not allowed
with respect to computer records.
Once again, no Arkansas case has yet raised this specific issue.
Agencies in Arkansas, similar to federal agencies, should not be
required to "create" a new record in the normal paper records
case. 93 However, as the discussion of Yeager indicates, the policy
underlying that protection does not survive application to computer
databases. 94 Moreover, Blaylock indicates that the Arkansas Court
may have some sympathy for those requesting access to computer
records. Thus, it is time for the Arkansas General Assembly to
consider this issue. The existing legislation is simply inadequate for
dealing with the question.
D.

Must Agencies Provide Programming Information?

The issue which arguably cries out the loudest for legislative
action is whether programming must be provided to facilitate the
use of computerized records. A simple hypothetical best illustrates
the issue.
Assume that the County Clerk's office in Sebastian County
compiles and stores voter registration lists on computer. Further
assume that the clerk's office, either on its own or through an

91. Long v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). See also Bunker, et al., supra note 6, at 57677 (discussing the criteria for determining whether nonexempt material is reasonably
segregable).
92. If the records were paper records, the request would be more akin to a
request to sort through and analyze data contained in those records. That request
would certainly be denied. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132
(1975).
93. Blaylock, 293 Ark. 26, 732 S.W.2d 152 (1987); see also WATKINS, supra
note 11, at 71-72.

94. See also Perritt, Federal Electronic Information Policy, supra note 7, at
232; Grodsky, supra note 3, at 29-31.
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outside vendor, has developed a special software program for creating
that list. If a requester may obtain a copy of the computerized list,
may the requester also obtain a copy of the program so that the
list may be accessed and used? Therein lies the issue.
If the software is developed by a private vendor or individual,
the copyright laws may protect the software from release because
such a release may violate the copyright in the work. 95 Also, unlike
works created by the federal government, 96 state and local governments
may protect the copyrights in many of their works. While certain
"official works" may not be copyrighted, 97 the ability to copyright
"non-official works ' 98 probably includes the ability to copyright
software.9 Moreover, the "competitive advantage" exemption in the

95.

TOBY J. MCINTOSH, FEDERAL INFORMATION IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE: POLICY

ISSUEs FOR THE 1990s 102-03 (1990). See also John A. Kidwell, Open Records Laws
and Copyright, 1989 WIs. L. REv. 1021, 1028 (1989) ("even though a privately
authored work becomes a public record . . .the owner's claim to copyright should
not be forfeited and open records laws should be applied so as to preserve private
copyrights.")
However, this issue is far from settled. The District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals has refused to exempt copyrighted records from disclosure under either
exemption 3 or exemption 4 of the federal FOIA. Weisberg v. Department of
Justice, 631 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1980). But see In re Inslaw, Inc., 83 B.R. 89
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 113 B.R. 802 (D.D.C. 1989). These cases have been
interpreted to say that both exemptions can apply in certain circumstances. Moreover,
they can be interpreted as addressing only the access issue, not the copying issue.
In other words, while a requester may be able to gain access under the FOIA,
copying a record may still be precluded under the Copyright Act. See Perritt,
Federal Electronic Information Policy, supra note 7, at 232-40.
96. No copyright protection is available for works of the federal government.
17 U.S.C. § 105 (1988). However, most government software programs are provided
by independent contractors who may very well have an intellectual property interest
in them. Andrussier, supra note 64, at 794-95; Perrit, Electronic Acquisition and
Release, supra note 7, at 297. Under the federal FOIA, for a record to be an
"agency record," and thus subject to the FOIA, it must be in the control of the
government agency. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980); Kissinger v. Reporters'
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980). Thus, an interesting legal
question exists concerning whether an intellectual property interest in a record
deprives the agency of control over the record. Andrussier, supra note 64, at 79495. This issue probably does not exist in Arkansas because mere possession will
suffice. See WATKINS, supra note 11, at 72 (discussing City of Fayetteville v.
Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990)). An added complication is that,
while the federal government may not copyright its own works, it may hold
copyrights assigned to it by third parties. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
97. E.g., Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
591 (1834); John A. Kidwell, Open Records Laws and Copyright, 1989 Wis. L.
REV. 1021 (1989).
98. National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc.,
495 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Ill.
1980), aff'd, 692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 814 (1983).
99. See WATKINS, supra note 11, at 228 n.469.
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Arkansas FOIA may also apply to government-created software, thus
precluding disclosure.'00 Thus, while the record (the list) is available,
the ability to use it (the program) may not be.
The problem posed by this issue is considerable. Clearly, access
to a record will be worthless without the ability to use that record.10'
Compounding the problem in Arkansas is the fact that Blaylock
may give the requester the right to demand the record in its computer
form. This right is somewhat diminished if the requester cannot use
the record once it is obtained.
Very little guidance on this issue is available. Federal agencies,
relying on an exemption in the federal FOIA which has no counterpart
in the Arkansas FOIA, 0 2 have argued that computer software is no
more an agency record than is a file folder or a rolodex.'0 3 An
Arkansas state agency, relying on the equipment-versus-records
distinction in Blaylock, could make essentially the same argument.
In other words, the need for additional software "tools" converts
a records request into an equipment request.
Yeager, on the other hand, indicates that programming
information may have to be released. The district court ruled that
if the records requested by Yeager had been disclosable, then "the
codes necessary to read and use the tapes" would likewise be available
as agency records. 0 4 The DEA argued that these codes were
"proprietary information" under section 552(b)(2), and thus exempt.
The circuit court did not rule on this question, leaving open the
issue of whether programming information necessary to read or run
a computer record is exempt as proprietary information. 0 5
This issue is actually two issues. The first question is whether
private software vendors should lose their copyright protection when
they sell to the government.'0 6 That, in essence, would be the result
if software were released under the FOIA. The down side of such
a decision is clear: vendors will either charge a premium to the
government or refuse to sell altogether. On the other hand, the

100. See WATKINS, supra note 11, at 120-21.
101. Cf. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Records Management and Archives,
53 U. PITT. L. REV. 963, 996-98 (1992) [hereinafter Electronic Records].
102. MCINTOSH, supra note 95, at 102.
103. See MCINTOSH, supra note 95, at 102. See also Andrussier, supra note 64,
at 794-95.
104. Yeager, 678 F.2d at 326.
105. Id.
106. See Perritt, Electronic Records, supra note 101, at 996; Perritt, Federal
Electronic Information Policy, supra note 7, at 233; Renee G. Rabinowitz, Note,
The Applicability of the Freedom of Information Act's Disclosure Requirements
to Intellectual Property, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 561 (1982).

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:417

overriding policy of government disclosure will be frustrated if the
necessary programming information is unavailable. The General
Assembly, unfortunately, can do little or nothing about this portion
of the problem because it is governed by federal copyright law.
Thus, any change or clarification must come from Congress.
The second issue, on the other hand, can be addressed on the
state level. It concerns the status of government-produced programs.
Whether they be state or federal, the policy choice with respect to
these programs appears less bothersome. The government has less
justificatiun for protecting its own programming than it does private
programming. 1 7 The private programmer is, presumably, a profitmaking entity with a valuable property interest in its copyrighted
program. Release of that program through the FOIA could be
devastating. Conversely, the overriding government interest, arguably,
should be to inform the electorate. Therefore, it seems that any
resistance to releasing government programs should be minimal.1°'
The counter argument is that, at least in some situations, the
government should have the ability to copyright and commercially
exploit its works. 0 9 The most compelling case for allowing the
government to copyright its works occurs when a government agency
creates a work which it would not have created in the normal
performance of its duties. For example, consider the county clerk's
office in our hypothetical. In that case, the argument would be that
allowing the government to claim a copyright advances the goals of
the copyright laws because the subsequent exploitation by the author
advances the goals of the copyright laws: benefitting the public by
encouraging the creation and distribution of original works.
The best counter to this argument is that government officials
are already charged with doing their utmost to benefit the public.
Any costs associated with the creation of a work are already paid
in te form u taxe. T
refore, the Individual agencies should be
encouraged to produce and release original works as a part of their
service to the public without any additional fee." l0
Another argument which could be made in Arkansas is that
programs alone are not records under the FOIA. This argument has
some merit because a program is merely a set of instructions for
the computer. Standing alone, it does not "constitute[] a record of

107. Perritt, Federal Electronic Information Policy, supra note 7, at 233; Perritt,
Electronic Acquisition, supra note 7, at 295-96.
108. See Kidwell, supra note 95, at 1023.
109. WATKINS,

110.

supra note 11, at 163.
11, at 163.

WATKINS, supra note
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the performance or lack of performance of official functions.'''
Thus, it is beyond the scope of the definition of records in the
Arkansas FOIA.
This argument, however, ignores reality. Records which clearly
are within the definition, our voter registration list for example, are
useless without the programs which run them. Therefore, the better
ruling would be to consider the record and the program as different
parts of one record in the FOIA context. The best method for
accomplishing this result is a legislative amendment to the FOIA.
A complicating factor in Arkansas is that our FOIA allows
access to records held by private firms when those firms are supported
in whole or in part by public funds." 2 In that case, the argument
for releasing even in-house programming loses much of its appeal.
Private organizations presumably do not have the same duty of
public service as public officials and agencies. They are merely
performing a service for a customer that happens to be the government.
Why, then, should a private agency be forced to turn over its
computer programming as part of a FOIA request?" 3 Conversely,
the government should not be allowed to frustrate access by shifting
its workload and recordkeeping to a private firm.
This issue, with all of its subissues and complications, amounts
to a series of policy choices. Does the software writer's interest
prevail over the interest in an informed public? If so, to what extent?
This policy is best determined by the democratically elected legislature,
not the courts.
E.

Personal Privacy

A problem lurking in many of these issues is privacy. The ability
to pool and compile information from a database can create a
privacy issue where none would otherwise exist. This problem is

111. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103 (Michie 1992).

112. Id.
113. Arguably, the private firm would receive protection from Federal Copyright
Laws for its programs. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1988); WATKINS, supra note 11, at
163. Clearly, the intersection of Copyright and FOIA law is an interesting and
controversial topic. E.g. Kidwell, supra note 95; Rabinowitz, supra note 106.
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this article.
Additionally, programming information owned by private firms who are subject
to the FOIA may be protected by an exemption in the FOIA. "Files" which would
provide an "advantage to competitors" (also known as the competitive advantage
exception) are protected from disclosure. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(a)(9)(A)
(Michie 1992). A private firm could certainly argue that a competitor would have
an advantage if it gained access to the firm's software. WATKINS, supra note 11,
at 163.
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similar to the rap sheets at issue in United States Department of
Justice v. Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press." 4 In that
case, a request was made for the rap sheet compiled by the FBI
on a reputed crime family in Pennsylvania." 5 A requester could,
theoretically, have gathered all of the information available in the
rap sheets from various government sources without implicating any
privacy concerns. However, the existence of a single source (the rap
sheets), which contained all of the information, made the rap sheets
exempt from disclosure for privacy reasons.
Likewise, a databank, with the proper sorting or by virtue of
its mere existence, may create a privacy problem where no single
record or set of records created from it would. This issue is of
particular concern because the right to disclosural or informational
privacy stems from the United States Constitution as well as the
various FOIA statutes." 6 Therefore, even if the FOIA allows release
of a record, the privacy of the individual must nevertheless be
protected.
Related to the privacy issue is the issue of whether the added
usefulness of computer access should be considered. Many have
argued that computer access should be allowed because the databases
are easier to use. 117 The computer can sort and organize data much

faster and more accurately than a person can. Therefore, the
information in computer form is more valuable. On the other hand,
the potential for abuse is much greater. Computer generated lists
from government databases which show earning levels, spending
habits, and other purely private information would be a very valuable

marketing tool, but would provide little insight into the operation
of government. Should the government be the source for such
information?
Notably, privacy concerns could be largely avoided if agencies
were required to engage in uAisclosure-avolUanice techniques such as
those at issue in Yeager. The principle concern is that the privacy
of individuals will be invaded because the vast amount of data stored
in a computer database will directly identify individuals with certain

114. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). See generally Bunker et al., supra note 6, at 583-94.
115. Reporters' Committee, 489 U.S. at 757.
116. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425 (1977); McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 766

S.W.2d 909 (1989).
117. This argument was the essence of the debate in Yeager. See also Bunker
et al., supra note 6, at 589-93.
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characteristics or facts." 8 If agencies were willing, or required, to
use reasonable compacting techniques, this danger would be alleviated
to a large degree. With the proper programming, the information
component can be released while the privacy component is
"compacted" out of a computer document.
In the final analysis, these privacy issues must be evaluated with
the purposes of the FOIA in mind. Certainly, it is not contended
that the possibility of invading one's privacy should dominate the
disclosure issue. Rather, it is contended that legislators and judges
should be aware of the fact that computer databases may implicate
privacy concerns in ways that paper records could not because of
their enormous ability to store and sort data quickly and efficiently.
As a result, new legislation must be crafted to protect privacy while
still ensuring public access.
F.

Meetings in the Computer Age

The following "meeting" is technologically possible."19 Members
of an agency can access the internet through personal computers.
They can exchange messages over the internet and even compose
documents. They can propose and vote on agency action. This activity
can occur simultaneously or over an extended period of time.
The advantage of this type of technology is obvious. Agencies
may conduct meetings without each member of the agency actually
being present in the "location" of the meeting. Moreover, the public
can "attend" these meetings far more easily by logging on to the
internet and monitoring the meeting rather than physically attending.
On the other hand, some interesting questions surface. Has a
"meeting" occurred for FOIA purposes? Or is the event more like
a record for FOIA purposes? Neither Arkansas nor federal courts
have addressed these issues.
Arkansas has perhaps answered the first question by implication.
In Rehab Hospital Services v. Delta-Hills Health Systems Agency,1 20
the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that a telephone poll of board

118. Disclosural, or informational, privacy protects the individual from having
the "intimate details" of his life which would "subject the person to embarrassment,
harassment, disgrace, or loss of employment" disclosed to the public in general.
Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1981); Young v. Rice, 308 Ark. 593, 598,
826 S.W.2d 252, 255 (1992). For a detailed discussion of the privacy interest, see
Brian G. Brooks, Note, Young v. Rice: The Personnel Records Exemption to the
Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 46 ARK. L. REv. 759, 773-75 (1993).
119. Greg Simon, Chief Domestic Policy Advisor to Vice President Al Gore,
Speech at the University of Arkansas School of Law (March 4, 1994).
120. 285 Ark. 397, 687 S.W.2d 840 (1985).
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members was a meeting subject to the FOIA. This telephone poll
is similar to an internet meeting; voting board members communicate
by electronic device rather than face-to-face. Thus, if it occurs in
Arkansas and all of the other requirements of the FOIA are met,
2
it should be a meeting subject to the FOIA.' 1
The second question is somewhat more troublesome. If an agency
meets by way of a telephone call, the action is a meeting. As
previously stated, the hypothetical meeting is arguably no different.
If the members of a committee, on the other hand, communicate
by mail, there is no meeting. Rather, records are created. This
situation would be analogous to sending an E-mail message which
is stored in a computer's memory. A record has been created by
"saving" the message. Then, arguably, no meeting has transpired
at all. Or is the event more like a tape recording of a meeting, in
which case a meeting has transpired and a record has been created?
In other words, the essential question is whether the exchange is
more like immediate communication as in a face-to-face meeting or
delayed communication through the mail.
In reality, E-mail is neither a record nor a meeting in conventional
terms. It is a completely new form of communication. As such it
should be specifically considered and defined with the purposes of
the FOIA in mind. By so doing, the difficult problems posed by
analogous reasoning will be avoided.
III.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

What should be apparent from the previous discussion is that
1960s statutes combined with 1990s technology have placed the courts
in a difficult position. Not one of the issues posed by the cases
examined or by the hypothetical meeting is squarely addressed by
the current legislation. Thus, the Arkansas General Assembly should
step forward and affirmatively resolve these issues before the courts
are forced to attempt to apply ' the antiquated FOIA. Fortunately,

121. On the federal level, the Sunshine Act provides the same analogy. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976). The

legislative history of that Act indicates that a meeting occurs when there is a
conference call involving the requisite number of members and the other definitional
requirements are met. H.R. CONF.

REP.

No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976),

reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2246-47. On the other hand, the same legislative

history appears to provide an out for federal agencies. Members of an agency may
consider "individually business that is circulated to them sequentially in writing."
Id. In that situation, the occurrence is not a meeting for Sunshine Act purposes.
This provision could be applied to E-mail in such a way that it circumvents the
Sunshine Act.
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if the General Assembly chooses to address these issues it will not
be forced to write on a blank slate. It has the luxury of using other
attempts to address these issues as guidance.
A.

The Electronic Freedom of Information Improvement Act of
1994

Senator Patrick Leahy has proposed an amendment to the federal
FOIA which addresses many of these issues. 22 The Bill specifically
recognizes the increased use of computer technology by the government
"to enhance public access
and that such technology should be used
' 23
information."'
and
to agency records
The first important provision under the Bill would require agencies
to publish electronically by computer telecommunications all
information required to be published by the Federal Register.
Moreover, agencies would be required to include an index of all
such information and a description of any new databases. This
provision is important because it requires access to information
through online databases. This fact alone makes the information
more accessible because it may be obtained in a manner more readily
available to the public. No longer would one be required to sort
through the Federal Register in a law library. Access could,
presumably, be accomplished at home or in the office.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Bill specifically defines
records to include machine readable materials "regardless of physical
form or characteristics .... "124 In other words, under the new
definition of "records," everything from an E-mail message to a
database to software appears to be a record. This definition is quite
125
similar to the definition in the FRA.
Third, the Bill mandates that access to computer records should
be allowed in most cases. If records are maintained in an electronic
form and requested in that form, access must be given in that form.
In other words, if the agency maintains electronic records, it must
provide access to those records when so requested. 126 Moreover, even

122. S. 1782, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), reprinted in 140 CONG. REc S12726
(daily ed. September 12, 1994). This discussion is based on the Bill as it was

originally introduced in the 103d Congress. It did not pass. However, Senator
Leahy will re-introduce the bill in the 104th Congress with some changes.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. § 2(a)(6).
Id. § 8 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(0).
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
S. 1782, supra note 122, at § 5 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(C)).
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if the records are not normally maintained in an electronic form,
an agency must make "reasonable efforts" to comply with a request
for them in electronic form.

27

Finally, the Bill defines "search" as either a "manual" or
"automated" search for records. 28 Therefore, it appears that an
agency would be required to search a database for particular pieces
of data contained in it. This mandate, because "data" are records,
is somewhat broad.
The advantages of this proposed legislation are numerous. In
particular, it forever solves the threshold question whether computer
records are FOIA records under the federal act. Likewise, it overturns
that portion of Dismukes which disallows the requester to demand
the computer record. Those facts alone make the legislation attractive.
On the other hand, the Bill poses some serious questions. The
first is whether it mandates that an agency must release all software
to a requester. On its face, it appears that it does. However, as
previously stated, the Copyright Act arguably supersedes the federal
FOIA and the Arkansas FOIA.129 Moreover, if such a release is
required, the Bill makes no explicit provision to compensate the
private software manufacturer. This result is somewhat unfair to
the manufacturer. Presumably, manufacturers would be left with
charging a premium when the government is the user. A better
solution to this problem is needed.
The second problem is that the Bill inadequately addresses the
creating-a-new-record problem. 30 Conceivably, the new definition of
search combined with the fact that mere data are records could be
construed as requiring agencies to employ disclosure avoidance
techniques like those at issue in Yeager.' Considering the court's
reasoning in that case, such a construction is consistent. However,
that would be a construction rather than a clear statutory mandate.
A better approach would be to establish a standard for when
compacting is allowed so the courts can follow it,1 2 rather than

leaving to the courts the question whether the statute includes
compacting at all.
By way of summary, Senator Leahy's Bill is a step in the right
direction. It puts to rest many of the most important issues.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
agency

S. 1782, supra note 122, at § 5 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(D)).
S. 1782, supra note 122, at § 8 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(3)).
See supra notes 95-114 and accompanying text.
See supra part IIC.
See supra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
For instance, the requirement articulated by Judge Oberdorfer, that the
establish that the task is too onerous. See supra note 89.
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Unfortunately, it leaves some equally important issues untouched.
With some fine tuning, however, it is a good starting point.
B.

Federal Agency Response

Recognizing the enormous impact of computer technology on
access to government information, the Administrative Conference of
the United States has drafted recommendations addressing many of
the above issues.'
The recommendations "are intended to guide
agencies in addressing the questions that will arise when an agency
considers whether to acquire or release information in electronic
form ....
11134 They supplement Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-130 which provides a "general framework for management
' 35
of federal information resources.'
Recommendation A deals specifically with FOIA questions. It
recommends that agencies recognize "information maintained in
electronic form" as records for FOIA purposes. 3 6 Moreover, it
recommends that agencies not deny access to these records on the
basis that retrieval of "electronic information is equivalent to creation
37
of a new record, or that programming is required for retrieval."'
In addition, agencies should provide electronic information in its
electronic form or in any other form that can be "generated directly
and with reasonable effort from existing databases with existing
software.' ' 38 Reasonableness is the watchword for future questions
such as those regarding the specificity of search terms and how
much programming an agency must do in order to meet a request.
The same reasonableness concept applied to searches for paper records
39
should serve as a guide.
Finally, similar to the Leahy Bill, the recommendations urge
4
agencies to electronically publish all data they are required to publish. 0
Additionally, the recommendations provide the agency with an
alternative. Agencies may allow others to publish the data. In other
words, agencies may contract with private information distributors
in order to accomplish this task. Moreover, the agencies are urged

133. 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-10 (1994) (Recommendation 88-10 was incorporated by
reference into C.F.R. For text see 54 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1989)). See Perritt, Electronic

Acquisition, supra note 7, for a detailed discussion of the recommendations.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

54 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1989).
Id. n.1.
Id. at 5210 (Recommendation A 1).
Id. (Recommendation A 2).
Id.
Id. (Recommendation A 3).

140. Id. (Recommendation C).
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to provide electronic access to information which is not required to
be released except through the FOIA. Once again, agencies may
meet this requirement by providing the information to a private
distributor.
These recommendations are somewhat similar to the Leahy Bill.
Both identify electronic records as FOIA records, and both require
data to be released in the electronic format when so stored and so
requested. Likewise, both measures require release of the electronic
version of a record not normally stored electronically when it is
reasonable to do so.
Although somewhat similar, the measures differ significantly.
The recommendations glaringly omit any discussion of the release
of software. Once again, the importance of this issue cannot be
overemphasized. Records in electronic form are useless without the
appropriate software. Yet software developers have a significant
property interest at stake. Any reform must address this issue.
On the other hand, the recommendations more adequately address
the creating-a-new-record problem. Recommendation A specifically
states that a "standard of reasonableness" should be employed to
determine the extent of a "search" and "retrieval" of records as
well as "in determining the extent to which FOIA requesters may
ask the agency to produce data organized in formats other than
those used by the agency in its regular course of business."' 14 , This
reasonableness standard is quite similar to the onerousness standard
discussed previously. 42 This approach seems adequate and should
be given some serious consideration.
Finally, the recommendations raise the possibility of using private
information vendors as an outlet for government information. The
central debate surrounding this recommendation is cost to the public.
Government agencies are allowed to charge only a reasonable amount
in recouping the expense of complying with a FOIA request. 43 Private
information vendors, on the other hand, will expect to make a profit.
Therefore, use of these vendors calls for an analysis of the possible
costs to the public. One can anticipate that requestors will eventually
contest the fee set by vendors as violative of the FOIA. In order
to survive this challenge, the legislation drafted should specifically
allow additional charges to offset the expense of electronic publication
and provide a reasonable profit.

141. Id. (Recommendation A 2).
142. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.

143. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1988).
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Such legislation has been validated by the courts. In SDC
Development Corp. v. Mathews,'44 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed a similar issue. SDC requested a copy of the Medical
Literature Analysis and Retrieval System (MEDLARS) on magnetic
tape. The system had been compiled by the National Library of
Medicine by statutory mandate. 45 The same statute authorized the
library to charge the public for using its services and materials.'"
The charge for a copy of the tape was $50,000.147 SDC contended
that the tapes were available under the FOIA and offered $500 to
cover the search and duplication.' 48
Then-judge Anthony Kennedy found that SDC's request was
properly denied. Central to his reasoning was the fact that the library
was not trying to protect the information from public scrutiny.
Rather, it was protecting its "system for delivering that
information.'" 49 Moreover, the agency had been directed by Congress
to charge for access and nothing in the FOIA prevented that
directive. 110
Similarly, the recommendations should call for a reasonable
charge to be sanctioned by legislation. Anything less will run the
risk of conflicting with the FOIA. On the other hand, one can argue
that private vendors should not be allowed to profit from FOIA
information. This information should be available to the public at
the least possible cost. Presumably, access through the agency itself
would be least expensive. Once again, this policy decision should
be squarely addressed.
C.

The California Solution

A final and quite interesting proposal has been presented in
California. Assemblyman Tom Bates has introduced a bill'5 ' which
would mandate free computer access to all disclosable government
information. The bill would require the creation of a "nonproprietary,

144. 542.F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976).
145. Id. at 1117 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 276).
146. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 276(c)(2)).
147. Id. at 1118.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1120.
150. The actual holding of the case was that the records were not "agency
records" for FOIA purposes because of the specific Congressional mandate. Id.
The reasoning, however, applies with equal force to the issue posed by the recommendations.
151. AB 4, 1995 California Assembly Bill No. 4, Reg. Sess., 1995-96, (available
on the internet at gopher://gopher.sen.ca.gov:22/l lgopher - root2%3A%5Bbill.
current.ab. from.0000.abO004% 5D).
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nonprofit cooperative public computer network" providing access to
all government data. The system would automatically redact "private
and confidential information" and "protect all government owned
' 52
or operated systems."'
The mandates of the bill would be accomplished by a task force
created under the bill. The bill directs the Office of Information
Technology in the Department of Finance to work with all state
agencies and members of the public to create and implement a plan
to accomplish the bill's mandates. The plan should be completed
by the year 2000, according to the bill.
Clearly, creating a public computer network from which one
could access all public data is the most ambitious of the solutions
examined. It avoids the majority of the issues by making the data
contained in government databases directly available to the public.
It also requires the protection of personal privacy and proprietary
interests. Likewise, the cost issue is avoided by placing it on the
taxpaying public in general. The question is determining whether it
can be done.
Presumably, the government will be required to survey all
information prior to placing it in the database to determine whether
it is exempt under the FOIA. This task is quite difficult. For example,
in the privacy area, the question is one of balance. The privacy
concerns in the information are weighed against the public interest
in disclosure in order to determine whether the information is
exempt.' 53 Balancing prior to releasing information into a database
will be difficult. Some notice to individuals presumably would be
required so that reverse FOIA suits may be brought. In short, if
this legislation passes, it will be interesting to follow the progress
of the task force to see how much success it has.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

In 1992, Senator Patrick J. Leahy identified changes to the
FOIA as one of the most pressing issues facing the Subcommittee
on Technology and the Law.' 54 The same is true in Arkansas. The
difficulty in applying a paper-era statute to computer technology
demonstrates he is correct. The ultimate answers to each of these
issues must be statutory. Legislatures must decide, on policy grounds,

152. Id. § 1.
153. See Brooks, supra note 118, at 778.
154. Senator Patrick J. Leahy, New Laws for New Technologies: Current Issues
TECH. 1
(1992).

Facing the Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, 5 HARV. J.L. &
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whether and to what extent access to computerized information will
be allowed. As with any legislative action, policy should dictate the
outcome.
The threshold question to be asked before any action concerning
the Arkansas FOIA is taken is whether the action will advance the
central purpose of the FOIA. In Arkansas, the legislative intent of
the FOIA provides clear guidance:
It is vital in a democratic society that public business be performed
in an open and public manner so that the electors shall be advised
of the performance of public officials and of the decisions that
are reached in public activity and in making public policy. Toward
this end, this chapter is adopted, making it possible for them,
or their representatives to learn and to report fully the activities
of their public officials. 55
Thus the act is directed at informing the public about government
activity. 5 6 The act does not currently allow, nor should it allow,
the release of information merely because it exists in a government
database. Therefore, legislative enactments addressing the release of
computerized data should be designed to mandate the release of
government data that advances this policy.
Computer technology can address this issue. Online databases
*relieve government employees of the onerous task of searching through
files and paper records in order to meet requests. In addition, online
services will make data accessible to members of, the public who
would otherwise be precluded. Likewise, both computer files and
online services make information searching and management much
more convenient for users. Finally, the ability to sort and search
records in computer formats greatly increases the speed with which
requests are met.
The converse of the above consideration is personal privacy.
Government databases are perhaps the single greatest source of
information about people. When this information does not serve
the clear purpose of informing the public about their government,
it quite often invades their privacy. Information dissemination is a
large and growing industry. 5 7 Government databases should not be

155.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102 (Michie 1992).
156. On the federal level, the United States Supreme Court has clearly enunciated
a similar purpose. "This basic policy of 'full agency disclosure unless information

is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language,' . . . focuses on the citizens'

right to be informed about 'what their government is up to."' United States Dept.
of Justice v. Reporter's Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)

(citations omitted).
157. See MCINTOSH, supra note 95.
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used to facilitate that industry at the expense of personal privacy.
The ability to store, sort and compile information about private
citizens is frightening. The Supreme Court of the United States has
indicated""8 and the Arkansas Supreme Court has squarely held 5 9
that individuals have a fundamental right to disclosural, or informational, privacy. Computer technology is perhaps the single greatest
threat to this right. Therefore, the fundamental rights of private
citizens also dictate rapid disposition of these issues. Legislative
measures must keep an eye toward the privacy of the individual.
Similarly, those who create the programs which drive computer
technology have a substantial property interest in those programs.
If government programs become available through the FOIA, that
interest is in serious jeopardy. On the other hand, without programming, access is useless. This conflict presents the difficult question of whose interests should prevail. This article has put forth the
view that private vendors should be protected but government-created
programs should not. That conclusion, however, is subject to debate.
Ultimately, this issue is one of policy. It should be dealt with by
the state legislatures and Congress.
Computer technology is simultaneously wonderful and frightening. It can allow the public to become aware of what "government
is up to" in ways never before imagined. This increased ability to
expose the operations of government to the light of day has the
potential to best accomplish the ultimate goal of the FOIA: an
informed electorate. The General Assembly should step forward and
address the issues posed by this technological wonder.

158. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
159. McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989).

